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*Edward R. Murrow*

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Director, United States Information Agency

**REFERENCE :** Memorandum for DCI from D/USIA,  
dtd 28 Aug 63

1. Thank you for bringing to my attention the reports from the world-wide survey [redacted]. I look forward to receiving subsequent reports in this series.

[redacted]

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter

*for*

**JOHN A. MCCONE**  
Director

[redacted]

**Concur:** [redacted]  
**Deputy Director (Intelligence)**

**ODDI/** [redacted] **jr (13 Sept 63)**  
**Distribution:**

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OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

August 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
John A. McCone  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

USIA recently transmitted to your Agency copies of the attached reports which summarize some of the overall indications from the worldwide survey [redacted] Other reports of this series will be sent as they become available.


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We would like to call these reports to your personal attention because we feel that the findings are very instructive in yielding a psychological balance sheet, so to speak, of strengths and weaknesses in America's image abroad. The indications have been brought to the attention of the President.

We feel that much of the value of this kind of audit of world opinion lies in trend measurements of changes over time. Accordingly we are presently planning a second worldwide sounding in the Fall, timed to yield a year end report. [redacted]

STAT

STAT  
50-111-153

  
Edward R. Murrow  
Director

Attachments

1. Some Indications of Worldwide Public Opinion Toward the U.S. and the USSR - R-141-63 (R)
2. Some Worldwide Attitudes Toward Disarmament and Nuclear Issues - R-142-63 (R)

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M/R:

Attachments being  
Approved For Release 2002/08/28 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002900180005-9  
held in ER.

63-6766



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Group 5  
Classification to be reviewed  
two years after date of publication

# Research and Reference Service

SOME INDICATIONS OF WORLDWIDE PUBLIC OPINION  
TOWARD THE U.S. AND THE USSR

R-141-63 (R)

July, 1963

This is a research report, not a statement of Agency policy

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Survey Research Studies  
Research Series

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### HIGHLIGHTS

An initial limited effort toward the measurement of "World Opinion" conducted in 15 countries in the wake of the Cuban crisis reveals predominantly favorable general orientations toward the U.S., and despite marked gains following the peaceful resolution of the Cuban confrontation<sup>1</sup>, predominantly unfavorable general orientations toward the USSR.

However, comparisons of U.S. to USSR standing in some major realms of competition reveal a far less favorable picture.

In all 15 countries surveyed most with opinions see the U.S. ahead in economic strength.

But only in eight countries is the U.S. predominantly judged ahead in total military strength, and in only four is the U.S. judged ahead in military strength in nuclear weapons. Four others were divided on this issue and seven predominantly viewed the USSR as the stronger.

In space standing the U.S. leads the USSR in only one of the 15 countries surveyed. In science the U.S. fares better but enjoys a really substantial lead in only three.

In view of these considerable indications of Soviet strength it is not surprising that not all are convinced that the U.S. is the wave of the future in preeminence as a world power. The prevailing judgment in nine areas is that the U.S. will end up the strongest in an extended period of competition without war. But in two countries opinions are divided on this index of long-range confidence, and in four areas the U.S. is predominantly seen as running behind the USSR or Communist China.

Finally, despite favorable general orientations, willingness to side with the U.S. is far from general in the countries surveyed. While there is predominant willingness to line up with the U.S. vis-a-vis Russia in eight areas, in three of these the margin is thin. And in the remaining six areas preference for non-alignment plus scattered support for the USSR outweighs allegiance to the U.S.

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1 For some post-Cuban trend indications of U.S. and USSR standing see R-99-63 "Trends in West European Estimates of U.S. and Soviet Strength", and R-122-63 "Current Trends in Japanese Public Opinion Toward the U.S. and the USSR".

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## FOREWORD

The present report, and a number to follow, mark an initial limited step toward establishing periodic soundings of that intangible but important entity "World Opinion". The ultimate goal is to block out for general U.S. government guidance the broad picture of world-wide sentiment about the U.S. and major issues of international relations. It will remain the function of other specific studies to fill in details as required on issues of importance as they arise, and in countries of particular significance.

This initial effort reflects more an aspiration than an achievement since the present extent of coverage is far from adequate to provide valid regional and world-wide generalizations. Africa is not as yet covered, the representation is particularly sketchy in the Near East, and in many countries it is only feasible at the present time to sample capital or major cities, rather than the national populations. (Details on the present samplings may be found in an appendix.) It is hoped that future efforts will progressively embody wider representation. In the meantime, the indications must be read, of course, with limitations of coverage in mind.

This particular set of soundings was taken in early 1963 in the wake of the Cuban crisis -- an event which surely qualifies as one of the major points of reference in post-war international relations. Other international developments were also part of the context of events conditioning the present survey, e.g. the Sino-Indian conflict, the Sino-Soviet disagreements and the Western disagreements about NATO and the Common Market.

In keeping with the broad purposes of this service, the reportage is both brief and broad. The accent is upon the tabular presentation of country and regional comparisons, the details of which readers of varied expertise and interest may interpret more fully. Survey measurements constitute, of course, only one technique of exploration to be considered along with other sources of information in drawing conclusions.

As an aid in ordering and consolidating the indications on various questions a net favorable index is provided as a supplement to the usual tabulation of alternative responses and no opinion. This index is obtained by subtracting the percentage of unfavorable responses from the percentage of favorable responses and yields a quick unitary index of the size and direction of predominant sentiment. "No Opinion" is treated as neither favorable nor unfavorable. This index is presented only as a convenience, not as a substitute for the original figures which yield a more comprehensive picture of the findings.

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Since the figures presented are based upon samples they are subject to a range of chance variation which increases as the size of sample diminishes. Little should be made of small differences, therefore, in the tables that follow, since they are often not reliable beyond chance variation and even where reliable are of little material significance. Attention should focus rather on the larger differences whose reliability is thereby more strongly established and which, because of their size, are more clearly of policy or program significance.

The generalizations presented in the text endeavor to take these statistical considerations into account. Readers desiring more precise information on sampling or other technical details about the present series of surveys are invited to consult the Research and Reference Service, USIA.

In the interest of simplicity, and in order to keep the present "World Opinion" paper within manageable limits, no figures have been included bearing upon trend changes in opinion over time. Such trend indications, when available, are presented in country or regional papers.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~I. Some General Orientations Toward the U.S. and the USSR

## General Opinion of the U.S.

It has often been said that great nations cannot hope to be liked. That such a thesis is open to challenge, at least in some senses, is the consistent indication from USIA worldwide surveys over the past decade. With rare exceptions general good opinion of the U.S. -- for whatever significance it has -- has clearly predominated over unfavorable feelings in the countries surveyed -- usually by very substantial margins.

The most recent worldwide soundings, taken in the wake of the Cuban crisis, are no exception in this respect, with levels of net favorable feelings (good opinion less bad opinion) ranging from a remarkable 88 per cent in Bangkok to no lower than 36 per cent in France despite current sharpened differences on policy.

"Please use this card to tell me your feelings about various countries. (CARD) How about ...?"

OPINION ABOUT THE U.S.

	Net	V. good	Good	Neither good	Bad	V. bad	No	No. of
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>opinion</u>	<u>opin.</u>	<u>nor bad opin.</u>	<u>opin.</u>	<u>opin.</u>	<u>opinion</u>	<u>cases</u>
West Germany	75	24%	52%	17%	1%	*%	6 ..100%	(1202)
Italy	68	30	41	12	2	1	14	(1200)
Great Britain	44	12	42	26	9	1	10	(1186)
France	36	6	40	34	8	2	10	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>								
Mexico City	71	15	58	16	1	1	9	( 389)
Buenos Aires	68	25	45	14	1	1	14	( 481)
Caracas	66	26	44	16	3	1	10	( 401)
Rio de Janeiro	41	13	32	21	2	2	30	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>								
Delhi	71	31	41	9	1	-	18	( 500)
Tehran	60	25	45	17	5	5	3	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>								
Bangkok	88	36	53	10	1	*	*	( 497)
Australia	81	34	49	13	2	-	2	( 830)
Saigon	79	28	53	13	2	-	4	( 493)
Singapore	57	13	49	27	4	1	6	( 498)
Japan	44	4	42	33	2	*	19	( 995)

\* Asterisks in tables indicate less than half of one per cent; minus signs zero per cent.

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## General Opinion of the USSR ...

In contrast, unfavorable feelings toward the USSR have generally predominated in USIA surveys and only in occasional instances have been outweighed by favorable sentiment. In the most recent measurements following the Cuban crisis only in New Delhi and Tehran of the 15 countries or cities surveyed did general good opinion of the USSR achieve a clear favorable predominance.

Some predominance of favorable opinion of the USSR has been characteristic in past surveys in non-aligned India, and most of a loss which followed the Chinese invasion of India has since been recouped. The present survey is the first in Tehran and reveals predominantly favorable attitudes toward the USSR in numerous respects, as will be reported in this World Opinion series and separately.

"Please use this card to tell me your feelings about various countries. (CARD) How about ...?"

OPINION ABOUT THE USSR

	Net	V. good	Good	Neither good	Bad	V. bad	No	No. of
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>opinion</u>	<u>opin.</u>	<u>nor bad</u>	<u>opin.</u>	<u>opin.</u>	<u>opinion</u>	<u>cases</u>
France	- 7	4%	19%	35%	21%	9%	12 ..100%	(1200)
Italy	-15	4	15	24	22	12	23	(1200)
Great Britain	-22	1	13	32	25	11	18	(1186)
West Germany	-60	*	4	23	35	29	9	(1202)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>								
Rio de Janeiro	-6	2	13	17	6	15	47	( 392)
Mexico City	-26	3	13	26	33	9	16	( 389)
Buenos Aires	-28	1	13	18	29	13	26	( 481)
Caracas	-33	6	12	16	30	21	15	( 401)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>								
Tehran	49	25	36	19	7	5	8	( 500)
Delhi	37	6	39	25	7	1	22	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>								
Singapore	- 3	5	16	41	17	7	14	( 498)
Japan	-15	*	8	43	20	3	26	( 995)
Bangkok	-22	2	12	38	26	10	12	( 497)
Australia	-36	2	14	22	33	19	10	( 830)
Saigon	-80	*	-	1	22	58	19	( 493)

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## Agreement of Basic Interests with the U.S. ...

As an index of general pro-American orientation possibly more significant than friendly feeling, as registered on the earlier question, is what might be termed fellow-feeling -- the extent of perceived agreement between the basic interests of one's own country and those of another nation.

This more stringent test of general attitude toward the U.S. reveals strength in most of the countries measured, but distinct weaknesses in some. Weakness on this index has long been present in France, a situation which has been aggravated by the current disagreements on the future of Europe. The low levels of fellow-feeling in Latin America compared to high levels of friendly feeling provide serious food for thought, and could suggest that much of U.S. policy if not seen as adverse to Latin America interests, may be seen as largely irrelevant.

"In your opinion, are the basic interests of (SURVEY COUNTRY) and those of the U.S. very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?"<sup>1</sup>

	Net Favorable	Very much in agree.	Fairly well in agree.	Rather different	Very diff.	No opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>							
West Germany	71	31%	50%	8%	2%	9..100%	(1202)
Italy	51	27	39	10	5	19	(1200)
Great Britain	50	19	51	15	5	10	(1186)
France	6	6	37	28	9	20	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>							
Mexico City	16	12	41	17	20	10	( 389)
Caracas	0	13	31	15	29	12	( 401)
Buenos Aires	- 1	19	18	28	10	25	( 481)
Rio de Janeiro	-11	6	21	14	24	35	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Delhi	52	20	41	6	3	30	( 500)
Tehran	9	18	34	15	28	5	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Bangkok	92	44	51	3	*	2	( 497)
Australia	87	46	47	5	1	1	( 830)
Singapore	35	14	48	19	8	11	( 498)
Saigon	34	21	39	15	11	14	( 493)
Japan	28	6	40	16	2	36	( 995)

<sup>1</sup> In Mexico question read ... "interest of Mexican and North American people."

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## Agreement of Basic Interests with the USSR ...

If the U.S. has some weaknesses in fellow-feeling the USSR has a great deal more. In none of the 15 areas surveyed, including New Delhi and Tehran which were high in friendly feeling, does the view point predominate that one's own country's interests are at least fairly well in agreement with those of the USSR.

"In your opinion, are the basic interests of (SURVEY COUNTRY) and those of the USSR very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?"<sup>1</sup>

	Net Favorable	Very much in agree.	Fairly well in agree.	Rather different	Very diff.	No opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>							
France	-42	2%	16%	38%	22%	22..100%	(1200)
Italy	-50	2	11	31	32	24	(1200)
Great Britain	-55	1	14	38	32	15	(1186)
West Germany	-87	-	1	21	67	11	(1202)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>							
Rio de Janeiro	-43	3	5	38	13	41	( 392)
Buenos Aires	-65	2	2	62	7	27	( 481)
Mexico City	-78	-	4	20	62	14	( 389)
Caracas	-80	-	1	8	73	18	( 401)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Delhi	- 5	6	24	27	8	35	( 500)
Tehran	-13	9	28	24	26	13	(( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Japan	-52	-	3	36	19	42	( 995)
Singapore	-66	1	7	37	37	18	( 498)
Bangkok	-71	-	8	42	37	13	( 497)
Saigon	-72	-	*	3	69	28	( 493)
Australia	-84	1	4	31	58	6	( 830)

<sup>1</sup> In Mexico question read ... "interest of Mexican and Russian people."

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## Confidence in U.S. Leadership ...

How next does the U.S. fare in the area of international leadership? The indication from the latest surveys in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis is that favorable attitudes predominate in 13 out of the 15 areas surveyed. The exceptions are Tehran where opinions are divided, and France where unfavorable attitudes prevail.

"How much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.S. to provide wise leadership for the West in dealing with present world problems -- very great, considerable, not very much, or very little?"<sup>1</sup>

	Net Favorable	Very great	Consid- erable	Not very much	Very little	No opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>							
West Germany	66	37%	38%	8%	1%	16 ..100%	(1202)
Italy	46	24	37	10	5	24	(1200)
Great Britain	18	16	35	25	8	16	(1186)
France	-16	5	28	32	17	18	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>							
Buenos Aires	47	37	25	9	6	23	( 481)
Caracas	28	26	31	17	12	14	( 401)
Mexico City	27	40	15	18	10	17	( 389)
Rio de Janeiro	20	12	27	12	7	42	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Delhi	31	15	28	6	6	45	( 500)
Tehran	- 3	12	30	29	16	13	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Australia	54	27	47	14	6	6	( 830)
Saigon	49	33	38	17	5	7	( 493)
Bangkok	47	22	50	23	2	3	( 497)
Singapore	21	12	38	20	9	21	( 498)
Japan	13	5	32	19	5	39	( 995)

<sup>1</sup> In Australia question read " ...ability of the U.S. leaders to handle present-day world problems wisely ..."

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## Consistency of U.S. Words with Actions ...

Tested next on a factor related to leadership -- consistency of word with deed -- the U.S. appears to have a favorable net balance in all but two of the areas surveyed. French views are divided on U.S. credibility, and for reasons that need exploration Tehran views are clearly negative in the net. In some of the other countries where the net favorable reading is positive but low the situation also invites further study.

"Would you say that what the United States does in world affairs generally agrees with what it says, or that its actions differ from its words too often?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>Agrees</u>	<u>Differs</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
West Germany	56	71%	15%	14 ..100%	(1202)
Great Britain	35	58	23	19	(1186)
Italy	29	51	22	27	(1200)
France	0	34	34	32	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>					
Buenos Aires	26	47	21	32	( 481)
Mexico City	16	50	34	16	( 389)
Caracas	15	47	32	21	( 401)
Rio de Janeiro	12	33	21	46	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>					
Delhi	38	52	14	34	( 500)
Tehran	-20	34	54	12	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>					
Bangkok	82	86	4	10	( 497)
Saigon	73	79	6	15	( 493)
Australia	53	71	18	11	( 830)
Singapore	41	64	23	13	( 498)
Japan	10	34	24	42	( 995)

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## Consistency of Soviet Words with Actions...

The Soviet reputation for consistency of word and deed is negative in the net in all the 15 areas surveyed, even to a degree in New Delhi and Tehran despite predominantly favorable general opinions of the Soviet Union.

"How about the USSR -- would you say that what Soviet Russia does in world affairs generally agrees with what it says, or that its actions differ from its words too often?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	Net <u>Favorable</u>	<u>Agrees</u>	<u>Differs</u>	No <u>opinion</u>	No. of <u>cases</u>
France	-28	19%	47%	34 ..100%	(1200)
Italy	-35	15	50	35	(1200)
Great Britain	-41	19	60	21	(1186)
West Germany	-70	5	75	20	(1202)
 <u>LATIN AMERICA</u>					
Rio de Janeiro	-18	14	32	54	( 392)
Caracas	-35	18	53	29	( 401)
Buenos Aires	-40	7	47	46	( 481)
Mexico City	-60	11	71	18	( 389)
 <u>NEAR EAST</u>					
Delhi	- 9	26	35	39	( 500)
Tehran	-19	32	51	17	( 500)
 <u>FAR EAST</u>					
Singapore	-19	30	49	21	( 498)
Japan	-29	11	40	49	( 995)
Australia	-51	16	67	17	( 830)
Bangkok	-52	11	63	26	( 497)
Saigon	-70	1	71	28	( 493)

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## II. Some Comparisons of U.S. vs. USSR Standing in Major areas of Competition

The indications from a series of questions may now be considered, which are designed to ascertain how far the Soviet challenge to U.S. primacy has made inroads into world opinion.

### Total Economic Strength ...

Soviet efforts to foster the image of a strong Soviet economy have not as yet made any really appreciable inroads into U.S. standing in this domain. The U.S. leads in total economic strength by large to very large margins in all the areas surveyed including the two -- New Delhi and Tehran -- which were predominantly favorable in their general opinion of the USSR.

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in total economic strength at the present time -- the U.S. or the USSR?"

	Net Favorable	U.S.	USSR	Neither/ Equal	No Opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>						
West Germany	81	83%	2%	4%	11 ..100%	(1202)
Italy	63	69	6	4	21	(1200)
France	61	69	8	6	17	(1200)
Great Britain	47	57	10	3	30	(1186)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Mexico City	77	81	4	-	15	( 389)
Caracas	71	78	7	1	14	( 401)
Buenos Aires	60	66	6	5	23	( 481)
Rio de Janeiro	37	46	9	1	44	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Tehran	69	81	12	2	5	( 500)
Delhi	63	68	5	1	26	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Saigon	90	90	*	2	8	( 493)
Bangkok	87	89	2	3	6	( 497)
Singapore	70	76	6	8	10	( 498)
Australia	62	70	8	7	15	( 830)
Japan	56	63	7	6	24	( 995)

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## Total Military Strength ...

Worldwide opinion is less favorable in respect to total military strength. In eight of the 15 areas surveyed the U.S. is predominantly seen as ahead; but in four areas -- France, Buenos Aires, Japan, and Singapore -- opinions are rather evenly divided; and in three areas -- Great Britain, Tehran and Australia -- the USSR is more often judged ahead in total military might.

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in total military strength at the present time -- the U.S. or the USSR?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Neither/ Equal</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
West Germany	34	50%	16%	18%	16 ..100%	(1202)
Italy	20	39	19	14	28	(1200)
France	- 4	24	28	19	29	(1200)
Great Britain	-15	26	41	7	26	(1186)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Mexico City	18	50	32	2	16	( 389)
Rio de Janeiro	15	32	17	5	46	( 392)
Caracas	13	38	25	17	20	( 401)
Buenos Aires	6	25	19	18	38	( 481)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Delhi	20	39	19	8	34	( 500)
Tehran	-16	33	49	5	13	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Saigon	58	59	1	20	20	( 493)
Bangkok	47	60	13	13	14	( 497)
Japan	3	31	28	13	28	( 995)
Singapore	- 2	28	30	22	20	( 498)
Australia	-12	25	37	14	24	( 830)

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## Military Strength in Nuclear Weapons ...

Of the two major components of total military strength -- nuclear weapons vs. troops and non-nuclear weapons -- it appears to be the former that poses the greater problem for the U.S. military image. In military strength in nuclear weapons only four of the 15 areas surveyed predominantly judge the U.S. ahead, four others are close to evenly divided, and in seven the USSR is more often judged as being the stronger.

Why two such close and presumably well-informed allies as Great Britain and Australia should be predominantly inclined to see the U.S. behind the USSR in military strength, both in nuclear and conventional components, particularly invites further study.

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in military strength in nuclear weapons at the present time -- the U.S. or the USSR?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Neither/ Equal</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
West Germany	35	46%	11%	26%	17 ..100%	(1202)
Italy	3	28	25	18	29	(1200)
France	- 5	24	29	20	27	(1200)
Great Britain	- 8	26	34	10	30	(1186)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Mexico City	12	46	34	4	16	( 389)
Rio de Janeiro	0	24	24	5	47	( 392)
Buenos Aires	-11	18	29	20	33	( 481)
Caracas	-12	23	35	22	20	( 401)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Delhi	5	32	27	7	34	( 500)
Tehran	-32	26	58	4	12	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Saigon	56	59	3	20	18	( 493)
Bangkok	38	50	12	26	12	( 497)
Japan	-19	20	39	12	29	( 995)
Singapore	-24	21	45	16	18	( 498)
Australia <sup>1</sup>	-25	20	45	17	18	( 830)

1 In Australia query was phrased "...in atomic and other nuclear weapons..."

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## Conventional Military Strength ...

In conventional military strength -- troops and non-nuclear weapons -- the U.S. appears to fare better, with the viewpoint prevailing in nine areas that the U.S. is ahead, in three that the USSR is ahead, and in three close to evenly divided.

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in troops and non-nuclear weapons at the present time -- the U.S. or the USSR?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Neither/ Equal</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
Italy	19	38%	19%	9%	34 ..100%	(1200)
France	- 2	26	28	13	33	(1200)
West Germany	-15	25	40	14	21	(1202)
Great Britain	-20	20	40	7	33	(1186)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Mexico City	23	51	28	-	21	( 389)
Caracas	22	42	20	13	25	( 401)
Rio de Janeiro	20	35	15	3	47	( 392)
Buenos Aires	5	25	20	10	45	( 481)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Delhi	16	35	19	5	41	( 500)
Tehran	3	40	37	4	19	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Saigon	30	42	12	20	26	( 493)
Bangkok	22	45	23	14	18	( 497)
Japan	18	33	15	12	40	( 995)
Singapore	14	38	24	14	24	( 498)
Australia	-10	25	35	14	26	( 830)

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## Space Standing ...

In the 15 areas covered in the present early 1963 surveys only in one, Saigon, does the opinion prevail that the U.S. is ahead in space developments. Although in a few areas opinions are not far from evenly divided, in most instances the USSR is seen in the van by large to very large margins.

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in space developments at the present time -- the U.S. or the USSR?"

	Net Favorable	U.S.	USSR	Neither/ Equal	No Opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>						
West Germany	- 6	29%	35%	22%	14 ..100%	(1202)
Italy	-34	14	48	12	26	(1200)
Great Britain	-46	13	59	8	20	(1186)
France	-63	5	68	13	14	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Mexico City	-10	36	46	3	15	( 389)
Rio de Janeiro	-22	18	40	6	36	( 392)
Buenos Aires	-35	10	45	20	25	( 481)
Caracas	-37	16	53	18	13	( 401)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Delhi	-45	11	56	5	28	( 500)
Tehran	-89	4	93	1	3	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Saigon	18	35	17	26	22	( 493)
Bangkok	- 8	29	37	29	5	( 497)
Australia	-55	11	66	12	11	( 830)
Japan	-63	6	69	7	18	( 995)
Singapore	-75	3	78	11	8	( 498)

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## Science Standing ...

In science generally the U.S. fares better but enjoys a really substantial lead in only three areas of the 15 surveyed.

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in scientific development at the present time -- the U.S. or the USSR?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Neither/ Equal</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
West Germany	47	58%	11%	16%	15 ..100%	(1202)
Italy	4	31	27	13	29	(1200)
Great Britain	-11	26	37	10	27	(1186)
France	-13	23	36	19	22	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Mexico City	8	44	36	2	18	( 389)
Buenos Aires	7	30	23	20	27	( 481)
Rio de Janeiro	5	29	24	7	40	( 392)
Caracas	2	35	33	17	15	( 401)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Tehran	11	49	38	4	9	( 500)
Delhi	2	33	31	8	28	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Saigon	40	48	8	23	21	( 493)
Bangkok	24	44	20	30	6	( 497)
Japan	- 5	29	34	12	25	( 995)
Australia	-12	26	38	18	18	( 830)
Singapore	-14	29	43	14	14	( 498)

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## Who is Seen as the Wave of the Future ...

In view of the considerable impressions of Soviet strength in the preceding comparisons, it is not surprising that not all are convinced that the U.S. is the wave of the future in preeminence as a world power. The prevailing judgment in nine areas is that the U.S. will end up the strongest in an extended period of competition without war. But in two countries opinions are divided on this crucial index of long-range confidence, and in four areas the U.S. is predominantly seen as running behind either the USSR or Communist China. Moreover, the significance of the divided or adverse sentiment is underscored when it is observed that it encompasses such important countries as France, Great Britain, Japan and Australia.

Also significant in the indications below is the growing thrust of Communist China. In not less than 3 areas -- France, Australia, and Singapore, about as many see Communist China as the strongest power 25 years hence as cite the U.S. or the USSR.

"If the U.S., the USSR, and China settle down to competition without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years, which of the three do you think will end up as the strongest?"<sup>1</sup>

	Net				All	No	No. of
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>China</u>	<u>Equal</u>	<u>Opinion</u>	<u>cases</u>
West Germany	46	59%	8%	5%	9%	19 ..100%	(1202)
Italy	17	38	16	5	12	29	(1200)
Great Britain	- 1	31	23	9	6	31	(1186)
France	-19	14	17	16	16	37	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>							
Mexico City	31	58	22	5	2	13	( 389)
Buenos Aires	17	39	18	4	-	39	( 481)
Rio de Janeiro	17	37	13	7	4	39	( 392)
Caracas	8	37	23	6	5	29	( 401)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Delhi	26	46	18	2	2	32	( 500)
Tehran	-34	23	47	10	7	14	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Saigon	52	58	2	4	10	26	( 493)
Bangkok	46	62	10	6	9	13	( 497)
Japan	- 4	23	24	3	4	46	( 995)
Singapore	-16	21	20	17	24	18	( 498)
Australia	-19	22	21	20	11	26	( 830)

<sup>1</sup> In Australia question read "If the U.S., Russia and Communist China settle down to peaceful co-existence -- that is, competition in trade, without war ..."

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Siding with the U.S. ...

Impressions of Communist strength, both now and in the future, may not be among the least of the factors engendering a disinclination to side with the U.S. in the cold war. In any case despite high levels of friendly feeling and considerable fellow feeling of interests in agreement, willingness to side with the U.S. is far from general in the areas surveyed. While there is a predominant willingness to line up with the U.S. vis-a-vis Russia in eight areas, in three of these the margin is thin. And in the remaining six areas surveyed preference for non-alignment plus scattered support for the USSR outweighs allegiance to the U.S.

The question remains open, of course, as to what extent preferences for non-alignment denotes "neutralism" in any literal sense. It is possible that many are devoted to the Western cause but wish to express a desire for independence of action, or aspirations toward a "Third Force."

"In the present world situation, do you personally think that, on the whole, (SURVEY COUNTRY) should side with the U.S., with the USSR, or with neither?"

	Net				No	No. of
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Opinion</u>	<u>cases</u>
West Germany	60	77%	1%	16%	6 ..100%	(1202)
Great Britain	9	49	2	38	11	(1186)
Italy	9	49	2	38	11	(1200)
France	-32	27	5	54	14	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Mexico City	8	51	-	43	6	( 389)
Buenos Aires	-14	36	*	52 <sup>1</sup>	12	( 481)
Rio de Janeiro	-17	26	3	46 <sup>1</sup>	25	( 392)
Caracas	-18	36	-	54	10	( 401)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Delhi	-12	34	3	43	20	( 500)
Tehran	(Not asked)					
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Saigon	81	89	*	8	3	( 493)
Bangkok	71	84	-	13	3	( 497)
Australia	50	73	1	22	4	( 830)
Japan	23	50	2	25	23	( 995)
Singapore	-38	26	3	61	10	( 498)

<sup>1</sup> Includes two per cent in Buenos Aires and six per cent in Rio who volunteered "Both".

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APPENDIX - SAMPLING SUMMARY

Western Europe

<u>Place</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Survey Dates</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Some Comments</u>
Britain	National	1186	Jan 19 - Feb 11, '63	Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Ltd., London	These are the same long established national samples that have been earlier used for West European regional reports.
France	National	1200	Jan 24 - Feb 8, '63	Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique, Paris	
W.Germany	National	1202	Jan 30 - Feb 20, '63	DIVO, Bad Godesberg	
Italy	National	1200	Feb 5-25, '63	Societa Internazionale per le Ricerche di Mercato, Milan	

Latin America

Mexico	Mexico City	389	February '63	Int'l Research Associates, S.A. de C.V., Mexico City	More extensive urban sampling, and rural sampling is possible but was foregone in the initial worldwide series in the interest of economy and because of a concurrent seven-nation urban and rural survey on a broad range of issues. <sup>1</sup>
Brazil	Rio	392	February 6-21, '63	Instituto de Pesquisas de Opiniao e Mercado, Rio	
Argentina	Buenos Aires	481	Feb-March '63	Instituto IPSA, Buenos Aires	
Venezuela	Caracas	401	February '63	Int'l Research Associates, C.A., Caracas	

<sup>1</sup> See USIA report R-110-63(R), "The Economic and Political Climate of Opinion in Latin America and Attitudes Toward the Alliance for Progress," June 1963, CONFIDENTIAL.

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Near East

<u>Place</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Survey Dates</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Some Comments</u>
India	New Delhi	500	March 1-15, '63	Indian Institute of Public Opinion, New Delhi	1961 electoral rolls were used to select respondents. All parts of metropolitan Delhi except Shahdara (where illiteracy is high) and Delhi Cantonment (where up-to-date lists were unavailable) were represented. Women are under-represented in the sample due to difficulty in reaching them and eliciting cooperation. Respondents were drawn from approximately 60% of Tehran -- the poorer areas being deliberately excluded in order to reduce the number of illiterates. All respondents were literate and had at least some formal education.
Iran	Tehran	500	April 1 - May 10, '63	National Institute of Psychology, Tehran	
Japan	National	995	February '63	Central Research Services, Inc., Tokyo	Random sample of all residents over 18 years of age.

(Continued on next page)

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<u>Place</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Survey Dates</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Some Comments</u>
Australia	Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide- Perth-Hobart- Launceston	830	Late March-Early Apr '63	Roy Morgan Research Centre pty., Ltd., Melbourne	Interval (every nth address) sample was drawn from regis- ters of electors. Inter- viewers asked for the young- est male over 21 or, if there were no men, the youngest woman over 21. Result is a sample with younger men slightly over- represented.
Thailand	Bangkok	497	Late March '63	Coordination Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Bangkok	Cities were divided into 20 areas. Approximately one third of these were selected at random, and interviewers were given a plan by which a predetermined number of interviews were conducted in each section. Poorer areas were deliberately excluded in an attempt to get only literate respondents, so the middle and upper classes are over-represented. Refusal rate was high among females; result, a sample of about 70 per cent male -- 30 per cent female.
South Viet-Nam	Saigon	493	Mar 28-Apr 3, '63	do	
Singapore	Singapore	498	March 21 - 25, '63	do	

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Group 5  
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# Research and Reference Service

## SOME WORLDWIDE ATTITUDES TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR ISSUES

R-142-63 (R)

July, 1963

This is a research report, not a statement of Agency policy

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Survey Research Studies

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HIGHLIGHTS

The idea of "general and complete" disarmament is supported by a majority, or near majority, in 12 out of the 15 countries studied. The more limited concept of nuclear disarmament appeals to the large majority everywhere surveyed.

More specifically, an agreement between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. providing for some degree of disarmament in Europe is predominantly approved by the West Europeans sampled.

Lesser margins among Latin Americans approve of an international agreement limiting further armaments in Latin America.

On the issue of inspection in banning nuclear tests, favorable views prevail in 12 out of 15 areas. Opinions are divided in New Delhi and are adverse in the net only in Japan and in Tehran.

Some of the beliefs and expectations associated with the near universal desire for at least some degree of arms limitation reveal marked indications of pessimism.

Opinion, on the average, is divided to negative on the possibility of abolishing nuclear weapons.

The belief predominates that nuclear weapons would be used rather than avoided in a new world war.

The belief likewise prevails that use of nuclear bombs on the battlefield would eventually escalate into the bombing of cities.

All of which leads to the strongly predominant conclusion in every area covered that one is not likely to survive a world conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons.

Despite these bleak views the majority everywhere surveyed apparently retain the belief that nuclear war is not inevitable, and that the countries of the world will get together in time on some way to avoid such a calamity.

The outcome of the Cuban crisis may well have strengthened this basic hopefulness since the effect was most often judged as diminishing the likelihood of nuclear war.

America is predominantly viewed as dedicated to peace, and the USSR -- even after post-Cuban gains -- is still predominantly seen as doing less than it should to prevent war.

On a more specific test, only limited minorities subscribe to the charge that America is likely to be trigger-happy in the use of nuclear bombs.

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## FOREWORD

The present report is the second in a series which mark an initial limited step toward establishing periodic soundings of that intangible but important entity "World Opinion." The ultimate goal is to block out for general U.S. Government guidance the broad picture of world-wide sentiment about the U.S. and major issues of international relations. It will remain the function of other specific studies to fill in details as required on issues of importance as they arise, and in countries of particular significance.

This initial effort reflects more an aspiration than an achievement since the present extent of coverage is far from adequate to provide valid regional and world-wide generalizations. Africa is not as yet covered, the representation is particularly sketchy in the Near East, and in many countries it is only feasible at the present time to sample capital or major cities, rather than the national populations. (Details on the present samplings may be found in an appendix.) It is hoped that future efforts will progressively embody wider representation. In the meantime, the indications must be read, of course, with limitations of coverage in mind.

This particular set of soundings was taken in early 1963 in the wake of the Cuban crisis -- an event which surely qualifies as one of the major points of reference in post-war international relations. Other international developments were also part of the context of events conditioning the present survey as the Sino-Indian conflict, the Sino-Soviet disagreements and the Western disagreements about NATO and the Common Market.

In keeping with the broad purposes of this service, the reportage is both brief and broad. The accent is upon the tabular presentation of country and regional comparisons, the details of which readers of varied expertise and interest may interpret more fully. Survey measurements constitute, of course, only one technique of exploration to be considered along with other sources of information in drawing conclusions.

As an aid in ordering and consolidating the indications on various questions a net favorable index is provided as a supplement to the usual tabulation of alternative responses and no opinion. This index is obtained by subtracting the percentage of unfavorable responses from the percentage of favorable responses and yields a quick unitary index of the size and direction of predominant sentiment. "No opinion" is treated as neither favorable nor unfavorable. This index is presented only as a convenience, not as a substitute for the original figures which yield a more comprehensive picture of the findings.

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Since the figures presented are based upon samples they are subject to a range of chance variation which increases as the size of sample diminishes. Little should be made of small differences, therefore, in the tables that follow, since they are often not reliably beyond chance variation and even where reliable are of little material significance. Attention should focus rather on the larger differences whose reliability is thereby more strongly established and which, because of their size, are more clearly of policy or program significance.

The generalizations presented in the text endeavor to take these statistical considerations into account. Readers desiring more precise information on sampling or other technical details about the present series of surveys are invited to consult the Research and Reference Service, USIA.

In the interest of simplicity, and in order to keep the present "World Opinion" papers within manageable limits, no figures have been included bearing upon trend changes in opinion over time. Such trend indications, when available, are presented in country or regional papers.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~I. General Attitudes Toward Disarmament

## General and Complete Disarmament ...

The idea of "general and complete" disarmament elicits majority or near majority support in 12 of the 15 areas surveyed. Reservations about such a course are most marked in the Far East, among the four regions covered, with a divided to adverse state of opinion in Saigon, Australia and Bangkok. Support for at least some partial limitation on arms, however, is everywhere widespread.

"What are your feelings in general about disarmament?"

"Are you for general and complete disarmament throughout the world, for some partial limitation on arms, or for no limitation on arms?"

	Net for General and Complete disarmament <sup>1</sup>	General and Complete disarmament	Some partial limitation	No limi- tation	Quali- fied answer	No opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>							
Italy	72	84%	11%	1%	1%	4%..100%	(1200)
France	64	80	14	2	1	3	(1200)
West Germany	52	70	15	3	1	11	(1202)
Great Britain	21	56	28	7	*	9	(1186)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>							
Mexico City	52	71	14	4	1	10	( 389)
Caracas	44	70	19	7	-	4	( 401)
Buenos Aires	44	66	19	3	-	12	( 481)
Rio de Janeiro	29	52	14	9	-	25	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Tehran	59	77	16	2	1	4	( 500)
Delhi	34	54	15	5	-	26	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Singapore	32	62	27	3	2	6	( 498)
Japan	25	49	21	3	1	26	( 995)
Saigon	0	41	32	9	2	16	( 493)
Australia	-12	41	40	13	-	6	( 830)
Bangkok	-22	36	46	12	*	6	( 497)

\* Asterisks indicate less than half of one per cent; dashes zero per cent.

<sup>1</sup> Per cent approving general and complete disarmament less per cent approving partial or no disarmament.

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## Abolition of Nuclear Weapons ...

The somewhat less inclusive and perhaps more precise concept of general nuclear disarmament appeals to the large majority everywhere surveyed, from almost 100 per cent in Italy and France down to the order of two out of three in Rio de Janeiro.

"What about nuclear disarmament? Would you favor or not favor the abolition of nuclear weapons throughout the world?" (Except in Delhi and Tehran, asked only of those who did not indicate approval of general and complete disarmament.)<sup>1</sup>

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
Italy	95	96%	1%	3%...100%	(1200)
France	93	95	2	3	(1200)
West Germany	80	84	4	12	(1202)
Great Britain	75	84	9	7	(1186)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>					
Caracas	83	90	7	3	( 401)
Mexico City	82	87	5	8	( 389)
Buenos Aires	74	84	10	6	( 481)
Rio de Janeiro	50	65	15	20	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>					
Tehran	73	77	4	19	( 500)
Delhi	68	72	3	25	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>					
Singapore	77	84	7	9	( 498)
Saigon	77	79	2	19	( 493)
Australia <sup>2</sup>	71	81	10	9	( 830)
Japan	70	71	1	28	( 995)
Bangkok	61	76	15	8	( 497)

<sup>1</sup> This question procedure assumes that approval of the whole -- complete disarmament -- includes approval of the part -- nuclear disarmament. In some instances this may not be true, and to this extent is a limitation on the figures shown.

<sup>2</sup> In Australia, question was phrased: "How would you feel about an agreement to abolish atomic and other nuclear arms? Would you favor or oppose a worldwide agreement to abolish all nuclear arms?"

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Would Complete Disarmament Require an International Police Force? ...

Among those favoring general and complete disarmament the viewpoint everywhere prevails that such a state of affairs would require an international organization with its own police force.

"Do you think that general and complete disarmament would or would not require an international organization with its own police force?" (Asked of those favoring general and complete disarmament)

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Would require</u>	<u>Would not require</u>	<u>Not asked</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
France	52%	9%	20%	19% ..100%	(1200)
Italy	50	11	16	23	(1200)
West Germany	47	9	30	14	(1202)
Great Britain	43	4	44	9	(1186)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>					
Buenos Aires	54	4	34	8	( 481)
Mexico City	45	18	29	8	( 389)
Caracas	43	20	30	7	( 401)
Rio de Janeiro	37	11	15	37	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>					
Tehran	65	7	23	5	( 500)
Delhi	39	3	46	12	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>					
Singapore	49	8	38	5	( 498)
Saigon	37	2	59	2	( 493)
Japan	34	4	52	10	( 995)
Bangkok	27	7	64	2	( 497)
Australia	25	12	59	4	( 830)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~II. Some Reactions to More Specific Proposals

## Arms Control Agreements for Europe and Latin America ...

Reactions were explored in Western Europe and in Latin America to arms control agreements embracing these particular areas. In Europe reactions were predominantly favorable by large margins for an agreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Bloc providing for some degree of disarmament in Europe. In Latin America approval predominated, but was less widespread for an international agreement that would limit any further build up of arms in Latin America.

"Would you approve or disapprove of an agreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union and its European allies providing for some degree of disarmament in Europe?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
France	59	66%	7%	27% ... 100%	(1200)
Great Britain	55	63	8	29	(1186)
Italy	44	59	15	26	(1200)
West Germany	34	57	23	20	(1202)

"Would you approve or disapprove of an international agreement that would limit any further build up of armaments in Latin America?"

<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
Caracas	34	62%	28%	10% ... 100%	( 401)
Buenos Aires	33	56	23	21	( 481)
Mexico City	12	48	36	16	( 389)
Rio de Janeiro	7	31	24	45	( 392)

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## Banning Nuclear Tests ...

The issue of inspection in the banning of nuclear tests was explored with results suggesting predominant worldwide support for the U.S. position. Favorable views prevailed in 12 areas, opinions were divided in New Delhi and were adverse in the net only in Tehran and Japan.

"Now on this card we find two people expressing different views about banning nuclear tests (CARD)."

Mr. A. says: "The U.S. should enter into an immediate agreement with the Soviet Union to ban nuclear testing even if the Soviets will not permit as much checking in both countries as the U.S. requests in order to verify that the agreement is kept."

Mr. B. says: "The U.S. should not enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests unless the Soviets agree to as much checking in both countries as the U.S. feels necessary to verify that the agreement is kept."

"Do you agree more with Mr. A. or more with Mr. B.?"

	Net favorable (B minus A)	Mr. A.	Mr. B.	Qualified answer	No opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>						
Great Britain <sup>1</sup>	40	20%	60%	-	20%..100%	(1186)
Italy	28	22	50	3	25	(1200)
France <sup>1</sup>	26	28	54	*	18	(1200)
West Germany	18	30	48	1	21	(1202)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Buenos Aires	58	9	67	1	23	(481)
Mexico City <sup>1</sup>	47	19	66	-	15	(389)
Caracas <sup>2</sup>	34	26	60	-	14	(401)
Rio de Janeiro <sup>1</sup>	30	8	38	-	54	(392)

<sup>1</sup> In Great Britain, Rio, Mexico City, and for part of the sample in France an earlier less specific version of the question was used. "A main reason why there has been as yet no U.S.-Soviet agreement to ban nuclear tests is that the U.S. wants checking by international inspectors on each other's soil, and the Soviet Union opposes this because they say it will lead to spying."

"Should the U.S. enter an agreement with the U.S.S.R. to stop testing without such inspection, or should the U.S. continue to insist upon such inspection as part of any agreement?"

<sup>2</sup> In Caracas question was phrased "Here are two persons talking about the prohibition of nuclear tests. With which of them are you in agreement? In agreement with 'Person A' in favor of U.S. entering agreement with Russia to stop testing nuclear tests without inspectors on each other's soil. In agreement with 'Person B' the U.S. should insist on inspection as part of any agreement."

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(Continued from preceding page)

"Now on this card we find two people expressing different views about banning nuclear tests (CARD)."

Mr. A. says: "The U.S. should enter into an immediate agreement with the Soviet Union to ban nuclear testing even if the Soviets will not permit as much checking in both countries as the U.S. requests in order to verify that the agreement is kept."

Mr. B. says: "The U.S. should not enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests unless the Soviets agree to as much checking in both countries as the U.S. feels necessary to verify that the agreement is kept."

"Do you agree more with Mr. A. or more with Mr. B.?"

<u>NEAR EAST</u>	<u>Net favorable (B minus A)</u>	<u>Mr. A.</u>	<u>Mr. B.</u>	<u>Qualified answer</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
Delhi	-1	27%	26%	-	47%..100%	( 500)
Tehran	-12	37	25	12	26	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Saigon	63	11	74	2	13	( 493)
Bangkok	51	21	72	2	5	( 497)
Australia	47	21	68	-	11	( 830)
Singapore	38	24	62	3	11	( 498)
Japan	-13	29	16	2	53	( 995)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~III. Beliefs and Expectations About Nuclear War

Some of the beliefs and expectations associated with the near universal desire for at least some degree of arms limitation reveal rather marked indications of pessimism, but also yield evidence that world opinion remains hopeful of avoiding nuclear destruction.

Is Nuclear Disarmament possible? ...

That people are far from sanguine about future prospects is evident first in estimates of the possibility of abolishing nuclear weapons. Though sentiment overwhelmingly favors such a course, the indications from 10 areas where the question was posed is that far fewer think it is achievable. Taking the returns all together, opinion is close to evenly divided if not somewhat negative on the average.

"Do you think it will be possible or not possible to abolish nuclear weapons throughout the world?"

	Net		Not	No	No. of
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Optimistic</u>	<u>Possible</u>	<u>Possible</u>	<u>opinion</u>	<u>cases</u>
France	15	46%	31%	23% ..100%	(1200)
Italy	11	47	36	17	(1200)
Great Britain	2	44	42	14	(1186)
West Germany	1	45	44	11	(1202)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>					
Mexico City	- 1	45	46	9	( 389)
Caracas	- 2	43	45	12	( 401)
Rio de Janeiro	- 3	34	37	29	( 392)
Buenos Aires	-13	34	47	19	( 481)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>					
Delhi	(not asked)				
Tehran	( " " )				
<u>FAR EAST</u>					
Japan	-27	23	50	27	( 995)
Australia <sup>1</sup>	-34	29	63	8	( 830)
Bangkok	(not asked)				
Saigon	( " " )				
Singapore	( " " )				

<sup>1</sup> In Australia, question was phrased "Do you think it will be possible or impossible to abolish all atomic and other nuclear weapons throughout the world?"

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## Would Nuclear Bombs Be Used In a New World War? ...

Next it is evident that the larger proportion of the people surveyed believe that nuclear bombs would be used rather than avoided in a new world war. Dissent from the general trend is particularly marked in France where the majority (61 percent) feel it unlikely that nuclear bombs would be used in a new world war.

"If a new world war broke out -- which naturally nobody desires -- do you consider it more likely that nuclear bombs would be used or do you consider it more likely that both sides would avoid using nuclear bombs?"<sup>1</sup>

	Net Optimistic	Nuclear bombs would be used	Nuclear bombs would not be used	No opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>					
France	37%	21%	61%	15%...100%	(1200)
West Germany	16	33	49	18	(1202)
Italy	9	37	46	17	(1200)
Great Britain	5	40	45	15	(1186)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>					
Mexico City	8	41	49	10	( 389)
Buenos Aires	- 5	44	39	17	( 481)
Caracas	- 9	46	37	17	( 401)
Rio de Janeiro	-36	56	20	24	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>					
Tehran	-34	61	27	12	( 500)
Delhi	-34	51	17	32	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>					
Saigon	- 7	45	38	17	( 493)
Australia	- 9	49	40	11	( 830)
Japan	-31	53	22	25	( 995)
Singapore	-35	61	26	13	( 498)
Bangkok	-37	64	27	9	( 497)

<sup>1</sup> In Australia question was phrased "Naturally, nobody wants another world war -- but if one does come -- do you think atomic bombs and other nuclear weapons are likely to be used -- or do you think both sides are likely to avoid using them?"

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## Would Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons Escalate?...

And if nuclear bombs are used at the beginning only on the battlefield, the strongly predominant opinion -- where this question was asked -- is that such use would eventually escalate to the nuclear bombing of cities.

"Some people say that if nuclear weapons are used on a battlefield it will eventually end in nuclear bombing of cities. Others say that this would not happen. Which is closer to your opinion?"

	Net	Bomb-	Would	No		No. of
	Optimistic	ing of	not	opinion		cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>		<u>cities</u>	<u>happen</u>			
Italy	-50	67%	17%	16%..	100%	(1200)
Great Britain	-62	73	11	16		(1186)
West Germany	-64	76	12	12		(1202)
France	-70	77	7	16		(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Mexico City	- 9	40	49	11		(389)
Rio de Janeiro	-10	37	27	36		(392)
Caracas	-28	56	28	16		(401)
Buenos Aires	-56	68	12	20		(481)

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Is One Likely to Survive a General Nuclear War? ...

All this leads to the conclusion that chances for survival are deemed slim if wars are not brought to an end. Without a single exception in the 15 areas surveyed the viewpoint predominates by large to very large margins that one is not likely to survive a world conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons.

"If there was a general nuclear war, is it your feelings that you personally would be likely to survive or not?"

	Net Optimistic	Likely Survive	Likely not to Survive	No opinion	No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>					
West Germany	-61	8%	69%	23% . 100%	(1202)
Great Britain	-62	8	70	22	(1186)
France	-66	7	73	20	(1200)
Italy	-69	7	76	17	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>					
Rio de Janeiro	-55	12	67	21	( 392)
Buenos Aires	-59	11	70	19	( 481)
Caracas	-72	8	80	12	( 401)
Mexico City	-81	4	85	11	( 389)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>					
Delhi	-43	14	57	29	( 500)
Tehran	-57	10	67	23	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>					
Australia	-43	15	58	27	( 830)
Bangkok	-53	18	71	11	( 497)
Singapore	-65	7	72	21	( 498)
Saigon	-65	11	76	13	( 493)
Japan	-73	4	77	19	( 995)

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## Is Nuclear War Inevitable? ...

Despite these bleak views the large majority apparently still retain the expectation -- which may be as much a hope -- that nuclear war is not inevitable, and that the countries of the world will get together in time on some way to avoid such a happening. In every one of the 15 areas surveyed on this point this streak of optimism predominates by a large margin over those who have resigned themselves to the inevitability of nuclear war.

"All things considered, do you believe that a general nuclear war is inevitable some time in the future, or do you believe that the countries of the world will get together in time on some way to avoid such a happening?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Optimistic</u>	<u>Nuclear War Inevitable</u>	<u>Will be Avoided</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of Cases</u>
Italy	76	6%	82%	12% ... 100%	(1200)
France	75	5	80	15	(1200)
Great Britain	65	8	73	19	(1186)
West Germany	58	12	70	18	(1202)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>					
Buenos Aires	77	4	81	15	( 481)
Caracas	71	10	81	9	( 401)
Mexico City	67	11	78	11	( 389)
Rio de Janeiro	67	9	66	25	( 392)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>					
Tehran	68	9	77	14	( 500)
Delhi	44	15	59	26	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>					
Bangkok	58	18	76	6	( 497)
Saigon	50	14	64	22	( 493)
Japan	47	11	58	31	( 995)
Singapore	41	22	63	15	( 498)
Australia <sup>1</sup>	36	24	60	16	( 830)

<sup>1</sup> In Australia question was phrased "All things considered, do you believe a worldwide nuclear war is certain to happen sometime in the future."

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This basic hopefulness may well have been inspired in some cases, and strengthened in others, by the outcome of the Cuban confrontation which was predominantly interpreted in all areas as diminishing the likelihood of nuclear war.

"All things considered, do you think the effect of the recent Cuban crisis has been to increase or decrease the likelihood of nuclear war in the near future?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Optimistic</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>No Dif- ference (Vol.)</u>	<u>Not Asked</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
West Germany	55	5%	60%	-%	11%	24%..100%	(1202)
Great Britain	51	2	53	22	18	5	(1186)
France	46	3	49	-	16	32	(1200)
Italy	38	5	43	-	38	14	(1200)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>							
Caracas	16	14	30	-	42	14	( 401)
Buenos Aires	15	8	23	8	52	9	( 481)
Rio de Janeiro	14	4	18	3	71	4	( 392)
Mexico City	9	15	24	7	52	2	( 389)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>							
Delhi	36	5	41	-	40	14	( 500)
Tehran	27	22	49	-	-	29	( 500)
<u>FAR EAST</u>							
Australia	32	5	37	28	25	5	( 830)
Singapore	32	16	48	-	-	36	( 498)
Bangkok	25	25	50	-	-	25	( 497)
Japan	20	8	28	-	37	27	( 995)
Saigon	17	14	31	-	-	55	( 493)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~IV. U.S. and Soviet Peace Efforts

Is America Doing All It should to Prevent War? ...

Whatever difficulties people see in attaining arms control and a stable world peace, there is no general inclination in the 10 areas surveyed on this issue to blame the U.S. for lack of trying. On the contrary the opinion predominates - though by only a limited margin in France - that America is doing all it should to prevent a new world war.

"Is America doing all it should do to prevent a new world war?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
Italy	63	73%	10%	17% ..100%	(1200)
West Germany	59	73	14	13	(1202)
Great Britain	27	55	28	17	(1186)
France	13	44	31	25	(1200)

LATIN AMERICA

Mexico City	51	71	20	9	( 389)
Buenos Aires	34	55	21	24	( 481)
Rio de Janeiro	26	48	22	30	( 392)
Caracas	25	55	30	15	( 401)

NEAR EAST

Delhi	(Not Asked)
Tehran	" "

FAR EAST

Australia	50	70	20	10	( 830)
Japan	44	57	13	30	( 995)
Bangkok	(Not Asked)				
Saigon	" "				
Singapore	" "				

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Is the USSR Doing All It Should to Prevent War?...

In contrast, Soviet standing tends to be negative in the net on this general index, though in the aftermath of Cuba considerably less adverse than it has been in past years. In Japan post-Cuban judgments of Soviet peace efforts are particularly favorable to the USSR, outweighing negative views by a substantial margin of 25 per cent.

"How about the USSR -- is Soviet Russia doing all it should do to prevent a new world war?"

	Net Favorable	Yes	No	No opinion		No. of cases
<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>						
Italy	7	40%	33%	27%	..100%	(1200)
France	- 1	36	37	27		(1200)
Great Britain	-12	33	45	22		(1186)
West Germany	-36	22	58	20		(1202)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>						
Rio de Janeiro	-12	25	37	38		(392)
Buenos Aires	-17	24	41	35		(481)
Caracas	-21	30	51	19		(401)
Mexico City	-28	29	57	14		(389)
<u>NEAR EAST</u>						
Delhi		(Not Asked)				
Tehran		" "				
<u>FAR EAST</u>						
Japan	25	45	20	35		(995)
Australia	-27	29	56	15		(830)
Bangkok		(Not Asked)				
Saigon		" "				
Singapore		" "				

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Is America Likely to be Trigger Happy with Nuclear Bombs? ...

Finally, in a more specific test of American dedication to peace, it may be seen in the two regions surveyed that only limited minorities subscribe to the charge that America is likely to be trigger-happy in the use of nuclear bombs. However, the extent of such views in Britain though outweighed by contrary judgments is appreciable, and marks one of the few occasions where criticism of the U.S. is greater in Britain than in France.

"Do you believe that one can rely on America using nuclear bombs only in an extreme emergency, or do you believe that America might be too rash in using nuclear bombs?"

<u>WESTERN EUROPE</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>	<u>Would Use Only in an Extreme Emergency</u>	<u>Might Use Rashly</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>No. of cases</u>
West Germany	77	81%	4%	15% ..100%	(1202)
Italy	50	64	14	22	(1200)
France	39	54	15	31	(1200)
Great Britain	32	58	26	16	(1186)
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>					
Caracas	68	77	9	14	( 401)
Buenos Aires	56	65	9	26	( 481)
Mexico City	47	67	20	13	( 389)
Rio de Janeiro	33	47	14	39	( 392)

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APPENDIX - SAMPLING SUMMARY

Western Europe

<u>Place</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Survey Dates</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Some Comments</u>
Britain	National	1186	Jan 19 - Feb 11, '63	Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Ltd., London	These are the same long established national samples that have been earlier used for West European regional reports.
France	National	1200	Jan 24 - Feb 8, '63	Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique, Paris	
W.Germany	National	1202	Jan 30 - Feb 20, '63	DIVO, Bad Godesberg	
Italy	National	1200	Feb 5-25, '63	Societa Internazionale per le Ricerche di Mercato, Milan	

Latin America

Mexico	Mexico City	389	February '63	Int'l Research Associates, S.A. de C.V., Mexico City	More extensive urban sampling, and rural sampling is possible but was foregone in the initial worldwide series in the interest of economy and because of a concurrent seven-nation urban and rural survey on a broad range of issues. <sup>1</sup>
Brazil	Rio	392	February 6-21, '63	Instituto de Pesquisas de Opiniao e Mercado, Rio	
Argentina	Buenos Aires	481	Feb-March '63	Instituto IPSA, Buenos Aires	
Venezuela	Caracas	401	February '63	Int'l Research Associates, C.A., Caracas	

<sup>1</sup> See USIA report R-110-63(R), "The Economic and Political Climate of Opinion in Latin America and Attitudes Toward the Alliance for Progress," June 1963, CONFIDENTIAL.

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Near East

<u>Place</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Survey Dates</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Some Comments</u>
India	New Delhi	500	March 1-15, '63	Indian Institute of Public Opinion, New Delhi	1961 electoral rolls were used to select respondents. All parts of metropolitan Delhi except Shahdra (where illiteracy is high) and Delhi Cantonment (where up-to-date lists were unavailable) were represented. Women are under-represented in the sample due to difficulty in reaching them and eliciting cooperation. Respondents were drawn from approximately 60% of Tehran -- the poorer areas being deliberately excluded in order to reduce the number of illiterates. All respondents were literate and had at least some formal education.
Iran	Tehran	500	April 1 - May 10, '63	National Institute of Psychology, Tehran	

Far East

Japan	National	995	February '63	Central Research Services, Inc., Tokyo	Random sample of all residents over 18 years of age.
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<u>Place</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Survey Dates</u>	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Some Comments</u>
Australia	Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide- Perth-Hobart- Launceston	830	Late March-Early Apr '63	Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty., Ltd., Melbourne	Interval (every nth address) sample was drawn from registers of electors. Interviewers asked for the youngest male over 21 or, if there were no men, the youngest woman over 21. Result is a sample with younger men slightly over-represented.
Thailand	Bangkok	497	Late March '63	Coordination Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Bangkok	Cities were divided into areas. Approximately one-third of these were selected at random, and interviewers were given a plan by which a predetermined number of interviews were conducted in each section. Poorer areas were deliberately excluded in an attempt to get only literate respondents, so the middle and upper classes are over-represented. Refusal rate was high among females; result, a sample of about 70 per cent male -- 30 per cent female.
South Viet-Nam	Saigon	493	Mar 23-Apr 3, '63	do	
Singapore	Singapore	498	March 21 - 25, '63	do	

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